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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC

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20 SEPTEMBER 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1972

Moscow (2905 items)

Israeli Attacks on Lebanon & Syria	(1%)	9%
Vietnam [PRG 11 September Proposals [Le Duc Tho in USSR (0.2%)	(9%)	7%
Iraqi President al-Bakr in USSR	(--)	2%]
Kissinger in USSR	(--)	4%
China	(8%)	3%
Tsedenbal-Brezhnev Talks in USSR	(--)	3%

Peking (1284 items)

Domestic Issues Table Tennis Meetings, Games	(34%)	36%
Vietnam [PRG 11 September Proposals	(18%)	20%
Israeli Attacks on Lebanon & Syria	(11%)	10%
DPRK National Day 9th East & Central African Summit Conference	(--)	7%
9th East & Central African Summit Conference	(9%)	4%
9th East & Central African Summit Conference	(2%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2905 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1284 items)</u>	
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Iraqi President al-Bakr in USSR	(--) 4%	Vietnam [PRG 11 September Proposals	(11%) 10% (--) 7%]
Kissinger in USSR	(--) 3%	Israeli Attacks on Lebanon & Syria	(--) 6%
China	(8%) 3%	DPRK National Day	(9%) 4%
Tsedenbal-Brezhnev Talks in USSR	(--) 3%	9th East & Central African Summit Conference	(2%) 3%

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INDOCHINA

In line with the Vietnamese communists' usual careful orchestration, the 11 September PRG statement on a settlement was presented by Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh at the Paris session on the 14th and given pro forma endorsements by DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy and in a DRV Government statement, also issued on the 14th. Predictably, followup propaganda, including an editorial in Hanoi's party paper NHAN DAN on the 16th, has hewed closely to the language of the PRG statement in expressing readiness to reach agreement with the United States that neither side will impose a government on South Vietnam and in stressing that the three components of the provisional government would be "of equal strength and on an equal footing." Hanoi's account of the Paris session totally ignored Ambassador Porter's statement, in which he criticized and asked for clarification of some aspects of the PRG proposals. Hanoi has also failed to mention the 15 September meeting between Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger.

Moscow has given the PRG statement minimal attention, although Podgorny expressed support for it in general terms in a speech on the 14th. Moscow's effort to balance support for its Vietnamese ally with considerations of U.S.-Soviet relations was pointed up by the fact that TASS reported on the 15th--the day after Kissinger left Moscow--that the DRV ambassador had been received by Katushev. TASS' report of Kissinger's press conference upon his return home noted that on the issue of Vietnam he remarked only that the two sides "outlined their positions" and that the Soviet Union's "views on Vietnam differ from those of the United States."

In a departure from past practice, Peking has failed to issue any formal or editorial endorsement of the PRG's latest peace proposal, limiting its authoritative backing to Li Hsien-nien's remarks when he received a copy of the statement on the 13th. Chinese spokesmen have generally been avoiding the Vietnam question in their pronouncements on international issues.

PRG 11 SEPTEMBER PROPOSAL ON SETTLEMENT PRESSED AT PARIS

The PRG's latest amplification of its position on a Vietnam settlement as outlined in the 11 September statement was formally presented by Foreign Minister Mme. Binh, as expected, at the Paris session on the 14th. She repeated verbatim the portion of the PRG statement which spelled out the "two requirements" which the

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United States must meet regarding withdrawal and a provisional government in South Vietnam, as well as the passages expressing readiness to reach agreement that neither side would impose a government and touching on the selection of the tripartite provisional government. She also echoed the statement when she said that the PRG is "recognized as the authentic representative of the South Vietnamese" by the socialist countries, the nonaligned nations, and peace- and justice-loving nations worldwide.*

Mme. Binh's presentation differed from the PRG statement in explicitly repeating the demand--introduced in the PRG's 2 February elaboration--that "Nguyen Van Thieu must resign and the Saigon administration must give up its policy of terrorizing and repressing the people." The 11 September statement had broached this issue only indirectly when it described the Saigon component of the three-sided provisional government as being "without Thieu." It would appear that the statement's failure to call explicitly for Thieu's resignation resulted from the decision not to repeat any of the detailed political demands which had been spelled out in point two of the February elaboration**--although the September statement did reiterate the specific demands on U.S. withdrawal outlined in point one of the February elaboration. The second "requirement" in the September statement dealt in broad, general principles, stating that "a solution must proceed from the actual situation that there exist in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces," that "it is necessary to achieve

* While the PRG's presentations at the Paris talks consistently contrast the PRG with the Saigon "administration," they do not always repeat the assertion that the PRG is the "authentic" representative. Since the resumption of the talks on 13 July, this has been said only once--at the 17 August session.

** Point two of the February elaboration stipulated that "Thieu must resign immediately, the Saigon administration must end its warlike policy, disband at once its machine of oppression and constraint, stop its pacification policy, disband the concentration camps, set free political prisoners, and guarantee democratic liberties as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements. Then the PRG will immediately discuss with the Saigon administration the formation of a three-component national concord government in order to organize general elections, elect a constituent assembly, work out a constitution, and set up an official government."

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national concord," and that "the sides must unite on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual nonelimination." Democratic freedoms must be guaranteed, it said, and "to this end, it is necessary to form a provisional government of national concord with three equal segments to take charge of the affairs in the period of transition and to organize truly free and democratic general elections." It was in an earlier passage that the statement had said that the PRG and the Saigon administration "without Thieu" will each appoint its people for the provisional government and that the appointment of representatives for the third component "will be made through consultation."

DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, again sitting in for Xuan Thuy, declared that the PRG statement puts forth "a correct and fair way to settle the Vietnam issue, insuring a lasting peace in Vietnam." He also said that "the DRV delegation fully approves of and supports the requirements with respect to the United States," and he concluded that "peace can be restored immediately, the Americans can withdraw in honor, and U.S. servicemen can rapidly be repatriated if the Nixon Administration will . . . positively respond to the two correct and reasonable demands of the PRG." Like Mme. Binh, Vy quoted verbatim both the first requirement on U.S. withdrawal--including the new call for the withdrawal of technical personnel--and the second requirement regarding a provisional government. He did not, however, quote the passage on PRG readiness to reach agreement with the United States on nonimposition of a government in South Vietnam or the one on the selection of the three components of a provisional government.

The VNA account of the Paris session often fails to mention the GVN delegate's presentation, but on this occasion it also ignored Ambassador Porter's statement completely. There was, characteristically, no reflection of the give-and-take following the delivery of the prepared statements, and Hanoi media did not report the post-session press briefings.

The DRV Government statement, carried by both Hanoi radio and VNA on the 14th, declared that the DRV "sees eye to eye with the PRG in its profound evaluation of the situation and in its correct stand on the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam issue as expounded in this important statement." Like the PRG statement, it prefaced a recapitulation of specific proposals with an attack on the Vietnamization policy and U.S. "escalation" and declared that the

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Vietnamese will not be intimidated by "bombs and threats." And unlike DRV Paris delegate Vy, the statement quoted the PRG's expression of readiness to reach agreement that neither side will impose a government in South Vietnam, as well as the "two requirements."

The statement concluded with a standard appeal for support, explicitly citing the "socialist" as well as other "peace- and justice-loving countries." It called on them "to struggle even more vigorously to force the Nixon Administration to put an immediate end to its criminal war of aggression, negotiate seriously, and meet in a positive manner the PRG's two requirements" The PRG statement, oddly, did not specify socialist countries when it referred to world support, although the February elaboration had done so. The Front as well as Hanoi has been claiming worldwide support for the latest proposal. And Hanoi radio on the 20th cited LPA correspondents in Paris for the report that Mme. Binh had sent letters and copies of the PRG statement "to foreign ministers of the socialist countries, other countries having diplomatic relations with the PRG, and many nonaligned countries." It added that she had also sent letters to "many antiwar politicians and personalities in the United States" and had sent the PRG statement to UN Secretary General Waldheim.

The NHAN DAN editorial on the 16th contrasted the PRG's "reasonable and sensible" proposals with the U.S. stand. It stated that as DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had observed in his National Day speech, a solution based on a provisional government of national concord is a just and honorable one. On the other hand, it said, the Nixon Administration's stand--as reflected in the eight-point proposal of last January and in the President's 8 May statement--is aimed at forcing the South Vietnamese to accept the Saigon "puppet" administration as legal and constitutional and at eliminating the PRG and the PLAF.

Without explicitly referring to the U.S. call for a cease-fire, the editorial said the United States proposed that "the revolutionary administration and the revolutionary armed forces give up their struggle for independence and freedom and lay down their weapons. . . ." It added that to negotiate "with a plot to maintain the lackeys and to eliminate the revolutionary administration means to negotiate with fists banging on the table to force the adversary to surrender, while seeking every means to use the Paris conference as a screen to hide and intensify the war of aggression."

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PEKING SHOWS RESERVE IN SUPPORTING PRG PEACE PROPOSAL

Peking has been conspicuously reserved in its support for recent Vietnamese communist pronouncements on a peace settlement, reflecting persisting divergences between Peking and Hanoi in their dealings with the United States. The Chinese failed to follow their usual pattern in endorsing the 11 September PRG statement, limiting their support to Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's remarks on receiving a copy of the statement from the PRG ambassador on the 13th.* Marking the first time the Chinese have failed to issue a formal or editorial endorsement of a major Vietnamese pronouncement since the seven-point plan was released last year, Peking's cautious response stands in contrast to its strong endorsement of the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" with a PRC Government statement and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial two days later. Moreover, in receiving the PRG ambassador for delivery of the 11 September statement Li substituted for Chou En-lai, who heretofore had lent his authority to Peking's expression of support for its allies on such occasions. Chou appeared on the evening of the 13th, however, at a reception for visiting ping-pong teams.

Peking's reticence in associating its interests with the Vietnamese conflict was again evidenced by Chou's failure to raise the question of Vietnam during a 17 September speech welcoming the Zambian vice president, who in his speech expounded at length on this issue and praised the Chinese record of backing the Vietnamese. In recent weeks Chinese spokesmen have generally skirted the Vietnam question while addressing themselves to other international issues.

SINO-VIETNAMESE
DIFFERENCES

Although NCNA duly carried the text of the 11 September PRG statement as well as the seconding DRV statement on the 14th, Peking's accounts of Vietnamese commentaries have reflected careful editorial discretion in treating sensitive issues of a political settlement and have muffled criticism of the Nixon Administration and the current U.S. negotiating approach. Taken together with Peking's reserve in supporting the 11 September statement, this cautious treatment accords with the carefully balanced Chinese

* Li's remarks are discussed in the 13 September 1972 TRENDS, page 7.

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approach to the settlement question that has stressed the need for an accommodation and has evidently been a factor in Hanoi's recent outcries against outside pressures for a compromise settlement.*

Consistent with Peking's own comment in recent months, NCNA's accounts of the 11 September LPA commentary and the 16 September NHAN DAN editorial muted demands centering on Thieu's removal while taking note of the call for a coalition based on an acknowledgment of the existence of two administrations and armies. Though the accounts repeated criticism of President Nixon's 25 January and 8 May peace proposals, NCNA omitted Vietnamese charges that the Nixon Administration is engaging in deceitful maneuvers during the current negotiations and is not seriously interested in a settlement. Characteristically, NCNA's account of the NHAN DAN editorial omitted a passage arguing that the "very bellicose, obdurate, and cunning" Nixon Administration is using the negotiations to help it in the Presidential election but intends to "cling stubbornly to the lackey puppet administration" in Saigon.

MOSCOW GIVES MINIMAL ATTENTION TO PRG PEACE PLAN

Moscow has thus far given minimal attention to the 11 September PRG statement on a settlement, although Podgornyy on the 14th did endorse it in general terms in the course of a speech at a dinner for the visiting Iraqi president. Podgornyy failed to mention the specific content of the PRG statement when he expressed support for "the constructive proposals of our Vietnamese friends" including the 11 September PRG statement, "which contained a demand for the halting of the aggressive U.S. war and the establishment of peace in Vietnam and the solving of the internal problem of South Vietnam while taking into consideration the current situation." Podgornyy also routinely reiterated support for the Vietnamese people's struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam and for their right to solve their internal problems without outside interference.

* Chou En-lai authoritatively voiced Peking's approach in a major foreign policy address on 9 July in which he cited the Vietnam war as marring a favorable trend toward peaceful settlement of "mutual disputes" in Asia. See the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 15-17.

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Thus far, there has been no further authoritative Soviet comment. Moscow had belatedly supported the 2 February PRG statement "elaborating" on the seven points with a USSR Government statement on the 11th. That had been the first such official Soviet statement to be issued following a Vietnamese communist peace initiative.* Moscow had endorsed the PRG's 1 July 1971 seven-point proposal with a PRAVDA editorial on the 5th--the day after Peking extended editorial support.

Routine Soviet comment, which has called the current PRG statement "a new important initiative" for peace, has focused on the point calling for formation of a provisional government of national concord. Kozyakov, in a 13 September commentary broadcast in English to North America, commented that the PRG statement has "answered many of the questions that are being asked in Washington and in the American press" and has made it "perfectly clear" that when it speaks of the right of the South Vietnamese to self-determination it "does not mean that there should be the communist domination that the U.S. leaders talk about."

Soviet commentators have generalized on the rest of the statement, giving little substance and failing to cite the new demand for withdrawal of U.S. "technical personnel." The initial TASS account of the PRG statement carried the two main points verbatim except for omitting the reference to technical personnel. Kozyakov's commentary contains the only reference in available Moscow propaganda to the PRG statement's treatment of the POW issue. Asserting that Washington has been using the prisoner issue to "justify" Vietnamization and support for the Saigon regime, Kozyakov said that the PRG statement makes it clear that the release of the POW's "depends on an end to the U.S. interference in Vietnam's affairs." He went on to quote the statement's assertion that the prisoners will be "speedily released" if the United States "ends the war of aggression, removes all U.S. troops, terminates all military interference in Vietnam, withdraws support from the Saigon puppet government, and lets the South Vietnamese set up a tripartite government of national accord."

KISSINGER VISIT Moscow characteristically gave only the barest coverage to Presidential adviser Kissinger's visit to Moscow and did not acknowledge that the issue of Vietnam was discussed until TASS on 17 September

* The USSR Government statement is discussed in the TRENDS of 16 February 1972, pages 8-10.

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reported his press conference upon his return home. TASS attributed to Kissinger the assertion that in Moscow the two sides "outlined their positions on the Vietnam problem" and that "the Soviet Union stands for definite principles in its international affairs and that its views on Vietnam differ from those of the United States." TASS did not report him comment that the private talks with Le Duc Tho indicate a "certain seriousness" on North Vietnam's part, nor his criticism of the PRG statement and his remarks on the imposition of a "particular form" of government in South Vietnam. Earlier brief TASS reports had noted that Vietnam was a topic Kissinger discussed with British leaders during his stop in London and that in Paris he met with Tho and Xuan Thuy.

KATUSHEV AND DRV AMBASSADOR Reflecting Moscow's effort to balance its interests in the relationship with the United States and its stake in Vietnam.

TASS reported that CPSU Secretary Katushev--who is in charge of relations with ruling parties--saw the DRV ambassador on 15 September, the day after Kissinger's departure from Moscow. According to the brief TASS announcement, Katushev and the ambassador had "a warm and friendly talk which covered questions of mutual interest," but there was no indication of the topics. There also was no indication that the ambassador handed over a copy of the 14 September DRV Government statement; TASS on the 15th duly reported the DRV statement. Although some East European leaders have been reported to have received PRG envoys for delivery of the 11 September statement, there has been no announcement that a Soviet leader met with a PRG representative for that purpose. Two days after the PRG had issued its 2 February elaboration TASS had reported that Kosygin received the DRV and PRG ambassadors, who informed him of the PRG statement and the DRV's "stand" (Hanoi's own statement not yet having been released).

BACKGROUND: Since then there has been no consistent pattern of reports on whether Soviet leaders have met with DRV and PRG envoys to receive copies of statements. There were no reports that any Soviet leaders received a PRG envoy following the release of the 15 April NFLSV-PRG appeal in connection with intensified U.S. military actions. The timing of meetings the DRV ambassador had with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Grechko, and Katushev in April suggested that the envoy presented an 11 April DRV Government statement and a 16 April party-government appeal protesting U.S. actions, but neither Hanoi nor Moscow specified this. VNA, but

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not TASS, had reported that during Xuan Thuy's meeting with Kosygin during a May stopover in Moscow, the DRV ambassador handed Kosygin a copy of Hanoi's 10 May government statement denouncing the U.S. mining of DRV ports. On 18 July TASS briefly reported that Gromyko received the DRV ambassador and was given a copy of President Ton Duc Thang's appeal on the occasion of the Geneva agreements anniversary.

HANOI REPORTS U.S. DELEGATION'S ARRIVAL, POW RELEASE

Hanoi gave limited coverage to the 16 September arrival of the American delegation which plans to escort home the three American POW's--Lieutenants Markham L. Gartley and Norris A. Charles, and Major Edward K. Elias--whose planned release had been announced in a VPA General Political Department order on 2 September.* In brief reports, VNA on the 16th and Hanoi radio the next day announced the arrival of the American delegation and its reception by the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity With the American People.

A Hanoi broadcast in English on the 17th carried a lengthy account of the release ceremony, interspersed with recordings of statements by various participants. Summaries of this event carried by VNA and in the domestic service on the same day did not include the texts of prepared statements attributed to the three pilots or the text of the VPA order, read in full in the English-language broadcast. All the versions emphasized the good treatment given the pilots during their detention and the DRV's "humane policy" toward the prisoners. Remarks attributed in this connection to Mrs. Bui Thi Cam, secretary of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity With the American People, stressed the responsibility of the escort delegation for assuring that the released pilots "will not be used by the U.S. Administration for military purposes and for misleading propaganda." This responsibility was said to have been affirmed by Mrs. Cora Weiss, co-leader of the delegation. The dual themes underscoring Hanoi's humanitarian treatment of the prisoners and its professed fear of possible U.S. mistreatment of them or their testimony once they arrive home had been stressed in propaganda accompanying the initial announcement of their release.

* For a report of the release order, see the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 15-18.

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Hanoi's broadcasts in English have given considerable attention to remarks imputed to Lieutenant Gartley's mother and Lieutenant Charles' wife during a tour of bombed areas in Hanoi on the morning of 17 September. A domestic service version of their alleged remarks, broadcast on the 18th, reported their shock at the sight of such "terrible destruction" and their hope that the American people will be made aware of the extent of it, attributing to Mrs. Gartley the conviction that "this war is meaningless."

DRV PROTESTS ALLEGED AIR STRIKES AGAINST SCHOOLS, DIKES

For the first time in several weeks, Hanoi has issued protests over U.S. air strikes at a ministerial level as well as in the continuing statements by the foreign ministry spokesman. The DRV Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Middle Schools denounced the alleged destruction of a college in Vinh Phu Province on 10 September, and the DRV Minister of Water Conservancy assailed alleged damage to the dike system in August. The former statement, broadcast in full by Hanoi radio on 14 September, charged that the United States had attacked "in the recent past" nearly 20 vocational middle schools as well as general education schools and various colleges.* Referring in particular to the alleged attack on the college on 10 September, the statement charged that the U.S. imperialists attacked it "with the purpose of not only killing its teachers, students, cadres, employees and workers . . . but also destroying the research and experimentation bases."

The DRV Water Conservancy Ministry's communique, reported by VNA on 13 September and Hanoi radio on the 14th, claimed that U.S. planes had made 78 attacks on dikes and other hydraulic systems in August, damaging 50 dike sections, 17 hydraulic works, two hydrological stations, and "a factory for the repair and production of equipment for the prevention and combat of floods and for hydraulic projects." After detailing several of these attacks, which it charged the United States had deliberately made during the high-water and storm season, the communique focused on the

* This statement is the first one condemning alleged bombing of schools to be issued by a ministry since 27 July, when the spokesman of the Ministry of Education issued a protest against alleged strikes since April.

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long-term effects of U.S. bombing. Attributing these both to the dropping of "delayed-action bombs" and to the inherent instability of recently repaired earthworks, the communique warned that the "U.S. imperialists must bear full responsibility for the consequences of their crimes and perfidious schemes."

Other comment on alleged bombing of the dikes and dams came in a wide-ranging Hanoi radio commentary of 16 September and in undated speeches by the directors of the water conservancy departments of Thai Binh and Ha Tinh provinces, reported by Hanoi radio on the 13th and 20th, respectively. The commentary, entitled "Nixon Is Frenziedly Attacking and Destroying Dikes and Dams," began by condemning the 28 July State Department report on the condition of the dikes in North Vietnam. Consistent with earlier comment on the report and on the President's 27 July press conference, Hanoi claimed that the Nixon Administration is trying to "avoid its responsibility for floods that may happen during the season of torrential rains." Listing alleged attacks on major targets during July and August, the commentary argued that the attacks were "deliberate." Acclaiming "dike day" (August 28), the commentary asserted that, despite this expression of world support for the DRV, the "Nixon clique" is continuing "its genocidal crimes against our people in both zones of Vietnam."

The Thai Binh water conservancy director's speech made only a passing reference to air strikes. He asserted that the province had overfulfilled its plan for earthwork connected with the dike and dam system and that people had been "urgently mobilized" to repair damaged dikes and build new ones in preparation for the late-rice season, while fighting against enemy planes "all the time." In more strident tones, the Ha Tinh water conservancy chief charged that "from 3 March to 23 August 1972 the U.S. aggressors attacked all the water conservancy projects in Ha Tinh 150 times," striking not only at dikes and dams but also at hydroelectric stations, motor vehicles, and dike builders and menders. Following a lengthy list of specific alleged attacks on dams, dikes, and sluices in Ha Tinh, the official claimed that the province's people "have made and are making all-out efforts" despite all hardships "to resolutely mend the damage inflicted by the U.S. aggressors."

A NHAN DAN editorial of 20 September, carried by Hanoi radio, condemned the United States for "dropping bombs to destroy cities, towns, and villages and to massacre countless civilians." Citing

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specific damage in various cities, the editorial claimed that such damage was intentional, as proven by the types of bombs used and the timing of the attacks. It called on "peace- and justice-loving governments and peoples" to protest and "take realistic actions to check" such attacks, and claimed that people in both South and North Vietnam are resolutely continuing to oppose the enemy. As evidence of the effort of the armed forces and people in the North, it stated that they have downed 422 planes in the past five months and killed or captured many pilots, as well as participating in "combat and combat-support activities" and persevering in production.

SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENTS;
REPORTS OF BOMBING

Alleged U.S. actions of the past week were protested in the following routine statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry

spokesman:

+ The statement of 13 September protested U.S. air strikes of the 12th on the capital of Ninh Binh Province and on populated areas in Yen Bai, Bac Thai, Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. In addition, it charged that B-52's had bombed a number of localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships had shelled coastal hamlets in Ha Tinh. The statement claimed that such bombing, carried out by the United States "with a view to massacring civilians and destroying economic and cultural establishments in the DRV," only reveals its "utterly brutal and blood-thirsty aggressive nature."

+ U.S. actions of 13 and 14 September were condemned in a statement of the 14th, which termed them "rabid, criminal war acts" and demanded in standard fashion that they be stopped without delay, along with other acts encroaching on the sovereignty and security of the DRV. The statement charged that targets of the 14th included Kien An township near Haiphong, the suburban districts of Gia Lam and Thanh Tri in Hanoi, and a number of populated areas in Ha Tay and Hoa Binh provinces. On the 13th, it claimed, U.S. planes "launched savage air raids" on the towns of Phu Ly and Hon Gai, the township of Ninh Giang, and many places in the provinces of Lang Son, Bac Thai, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Without specifying the date, it also charged that B-52's "carpet-bombed" localities in Quang Binh Province, and claimed that U.S. warships shelled a commune in the Vinh Linh zone.

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+ The statement of the 15th repeated the charges in the preceding day's statement of U.S. raids on Kien An and the suburbs of Hanoi and added other targets allegedly hit in actions of the 14th: the capital of Thanh Hoa Province and "many densely populated areas" in Son La, Bac Thai, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Ha Tay, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further claimed that B-52's bombed a number of localities in Quang Binh. Specific targets listed were a senior middle school in Dong Hung district of Thai Binh Province and a section of the Red River dikes in a village in Thuong Tin district of Ha Tay Province.

+ Condemning U.S. actions of 15 September, the spokesman's statement of the 16th charged that the capital cities of Ha Bac and Vinh Phu provinces were bombed, together with Ha Tu township in Quang Ninh Province and "many other populous areas" in Vinh Phu, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. The statement further claimed that B-52's had raided localities in Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships had shelled coastal areas in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Among targets reported hit were "many houses and public institutions and utilities, including a secondary school, a dike, and a sluice."

+ The statement of the 17th, claiming further attacks of the 16th on the suburbs of Hanoi, charged that "the continued attacks on Hanoi capital and intensified strikes by aircraft including B-52's on populous areas aimed at massacring civilians have further exposed the utterly brutal aggressive nature of the Nixon Administration." In addition to the alleged attacks on the Hanoi area, the statement cited U.S. bombing of populated areas in the province of Yen Bai, Tuyen Quang, Vinh Phu, Ha Tay, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh zone; B-52 attacks on localities in Quang Binh Province; and shelling by U.S. warships of coastal villages and hamlets in Thai Binh, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Many homes and economic and cultural establishments were reported destroyed.

+ Cat Ba Island and the Do Son area of Haiphong were highlighted in the spokesman's statement of 18 September, which protested raids of the 17th. It further charged that U.S. planes bombed densely populated areas in Lang Son, Bac Thai, Quang Ninh, Ha Hung, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh areas, and that U.S. warships bombarded coastal areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha and Thanh Hoa.

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+ The United States' "mad war acts" of 18 September were protested in the spokesman's statement of the 19th, which cited as specific examples the alleged bombing of an elementary school in Hai Hau district of Nam Ha Province and of a dike along the Red River in a village in Xuan Thuy district of the same province. In more general terms, the statement charged that U.S. planes bombed and strafed the capital cities of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces as well as populated areas in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and in the Vinh Linh zone. It further charged that B-52's had bombed "a number of localities" in Quang Binh Province.

In several reports issued during the week VNA detailed the following U.S. air raids, with special emphasis given to those of 14 September:

The town of Kien An near Haiphong was reportedly struck on the 14th for the fifth time since 26 August. In this, the latest attack, U.S. planes were charged with dropping "more than 100 demolition and blast bombs," which allegedly damaged several streets, two schools, assorted restaurants, food stores and homes, and one church, as well as "exacting heavy tolls" on the civilian population. In other action of the 14th, U.S. planes reportedly carried out "massive bombing" of the capital of Thanh Hoa Province, dropping antipersonnel, demolition and perforating bombs and damaging homes, various enterprises and a pagoda, as well as classrooms, kindergartens and living quarters in one sector of the city; and struck at populated areas in Ha Tay Province, allegedly for the fifth day in a row, causing damage to a cooperative in a village in Chuong My district and to a 200-meter section of the Red River dike in Thoung Tin district.

Phu Tho, the capital of Vinh Phu Province, was reportedly hit in raids of the 15th, as well as many villages in Thanh Ba district of that province; alleged targets included a T.B. sanitorium, a creche, a cooperative, and a school. Bombing on the 15th of Bac Giang, the capital of Ha Bac Province, reportedly resulted in heavy damage to all quarters of the city, with several stores and cooperatives cited as major targets; it also allegedly caused extensive damage to two dikes and two sluices located on both banks of the Thuong River. And on the 16th, Ha Tay Province was again the scene of attacks on villages and hamlets in a number of districts in which houses, cooperatives and several dike sections were hit. Of the dikes, only that in Thuong Tin district was specified, with reference to the previous bombing on 14 September; according to VN, this dike

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protects an area of 60,000 hectares spread over six districts in the province. A further report of bomb damage sustained on 16 September charged that U.S. planes, in two separate attacks, bombed the La River dike in Duc Tho district of Ha Tinh Province, damaging a 150-meter stretch of the dike and causing many casualties among people working on or near it.

PLANE DOWNINGS As of 19 September, Hanoi claimed to have downed 3,924 U.S. planes, with downings during the week reported over 10 provinces and the city of Haiphong. Hanoi radio on 18 September reported that one of the alleged downings, over Quang Binh Province on 15 September, was of a B-52; the same broadcast also said that three U.S. warships had been set afire by coastal artillery during the week. Figures on plane downings for the first half of September were provided in the Hanoi radio account on 15 September of downings on the 14th and 15th. According to this broadcast, 46 aircraft had been downed and "many air pirates" captured as of 15 September; receiving special praise were the multiple downings of 2, 6, 11 and 12 September, which allegedly included a B-52 on the 6th and the 3,900th plane on the 12th. Further reaction to the downing of the 3,900th plane, initially discussed in last week's TRENDS, included the VPA High Command's commendation of the 12th, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 13th.

Other figures on plane downings, together with an assessment of the air defense situation in the Fourth Military Region (including Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone) appeared in a Hanoi radio broadcast of 13 September. Reporting on a recent conference of "leading cadres of the anti-aircraft defense force" of the region, the broadcast lauded the region's initiative and coordination in successfully opposing increasingly frequent and more sophisticated U.S. raids. According to the report, the region had downed "about 150" U.S. planes since 1 April, "including nine B-52's," and "all three categories of troops" had fought well. The conference concluded by calling for an emulation campaign for achieving outstanding exploits and "contributing to quickly bringing the total number of U.S. aircraft downed over the North to 4,000 aircraft."

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HEAVY ALLIED CASUALTIES IN QUANG TRI CALLED MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT

In the wake of the Saigon forces' capture of the citadel in Quang Tri city on 15 September, Hanoi and Front media have set out to picture the communists as the real victors since they allegedly have successfully fulfilled their primary responsibility of destroying the adversary's forces. This point was made in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 18th which, in listing "excellent" features on the Quang Tri battlefield, claimed that liberation troops have "annihilated" more than 24,000 allied troops in the province since the GVN's counteroffensive was launched on 28 June. The editorial observed that "destroying the enemy's strength is always a primary, essential task in war." It lauded the "firm, brave, and flexible commands at all echelons" which were said to have maintained the initiative and considered the annihilation of the enemy potential as the objective of their military action. The paper observed that the fighting in Quang Tri is continuing and predicted that the liberation forces would "certainly annihilate much more of the enemy potential, surround him, and advance toward completely dooming his operation."

This approach was also taken in an 18 September LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) report on the fighting in Quang Tri. It said: "In a war the annihilation of enemy forces is the first objective; the liberation fighters in Quang Tri have fulfilled with great merit their main task." An LPA report on 17 September, in addition to claiming that Quang Tri liberation forces had put out of action 24,000 troops since the GVN counteroffensive, also alleged that 180 planes had been downed or destroyed and 240 military vehicles wrecked, including 90 tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Hanoi has attempted to portray previous ARVN achievements as defeats by stressing the losses inflicted on the allied forces. For example, the military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant), in a 4 August article, rejected allied claims of having scored a victory by holding the provincial capital of An Loc and argued that the fighting there was really a "big disaster" since it pinned down and depleted three divisions.* On the other hand, some propaganda has appeared to question this line of reasoning. One atypical commentary from the South Vietnamese communist party journal TIEN PHONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 3 June, had appeared to criticize communist failure to take such objectives as An Loc: It urged more resolute attacks at the provincial level and added that it is not enough to annihilate manpower but "we must also liberate" areas.

* See the TRENDS of 9 August 1972, page 17.

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DRV PROPAGANDA JOURNAL STRESSES CORRECTNESS OF PARTY POLICIES

Articles in the July-August issue of the journal TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), now available in translation, contained further evidence of the North Vietnamese party's concern to defend its policies in the face of disagreements with its communist allies and to justify these policies to its people. While the articles may well have been aimed at countering doubts at lower levels of the party about the wisdom of the current offensive, they contain the unmistakable message that Hanoi intends to stick to its course, even in the face of strong opposition from abroad. The existence of incorrect attitudes among party members in the wake of Hanoi's disputes with its allies had been implied when an article in the January-February issue of TUYEN HUAN had noted that "most cadres and party members" have demonstrated "steadfast political standards" and confidence in the party's line in the face of persistent differences in the socialist camp over viewpoints and lines on "fundamental problems of the era."*

In line with the 24 August NHAN DAN editorial which called for a program to "explain the basic situation of the resistance" during the current offensive,** the lead article in TUYEN HUAN held that "it is necessary to insure that our party and all our armed forces and people thoroughly understand the party Central Committee's assessment and guideline" concerning such things as "the present basic situation and the immediate tasks," "our victorious position" and the enemy's "defeated" position, and the "prospects for winning great victories." Suggesting that there is a need to counteract disappointment with the offensive, the article noted that the "value" of "victories in the current offensive" will be "greatly enhanced if we enable everyone to clearly see the background of the struggle and fully understand the difficulties that our armed forces and people have overcome on the battlefield." Adopting a nationalistic tone which is repeated elsewhere in the journal, the article claimed that these "victories" are a result of the determination of the Vietnamese people and the party's "correct,

* The January-February 1972 TUYEN HUAN article is discussed in the 22 March 1972 TRENDS, pages 20-22.

** The 24 August editorial is discussed in the 30 August 1972 TRENDS, pages 6-7.

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independent, and sovereign line." It went on to affirm that the Vietnamese can deal with further difficulties and challenges, and pointedly noted that at the time of the August revolution the DRV coped with "a horde of wicked imperialists in a situation in which the USSR was far away" and "the Chinese revolution had not yet triumphed."

The second article in TUYEN HUAN by Thanh Son--a signature which has appeared over other articles in the propaganda journal as well as in the party journal HOC TAP--opened with praise for the 4,000-year-old history of Vietnam, and for the creativity of the Vietnamese people and nation and their successful battles against aggressors, "including great countries." While such praise for Vietnam's past is not uncommon in the DRV's theoretical writings, Thanh Son's article was unusual in its direct reassurance of Vietnamese who lack confidence in the party and its policies. Thanh Son argued with nationalistic fervor against undervaluing the contribution of the Vietnamese party in formulating the policies guiding the nation's struggle. He berated "many people" who believe the party, like any other party, is only applying Marxism-Leninism and who "do not understand our national creativity and our creativity in party leadership guidelines." He maintained that Marxism-Leninism is a "guide" but not a "dogma" and that foreign experience cannot be strictly applied to Vietnam without taking the concrete conditions of the country into consideration. And he asserted that "every success of the Vietnamese revolution is the result of a correct and creative application by our party of Marxist-Leninist principles and the experiences of the world revolutionary movement to the concrete situation and conditions in Vietnam." The article also rejected the point of view of people who, because of their "idolizing of foreign experiences, are 'modest' to such a degree that they have an inferiority complex; they see great things only in foreign countries and fail to recognize great, creative things in their own country." And it dismissed the notion that great and creative achievements are unlikely in Vietnam because it is a small country.

In illustrating the Vietnamese party's past formulation of policy, Thanh Son chose to recall developments in the 1965-1966 period--a time when Hanoi appeared to have differences with its allies over

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the courses it adopted.* Thanh Son even took note of those differences when he recalled that at that time "even people who sympathized with and had good will toward our resistance were filled with misgivings and consternation" and were "afraid that the Vietnamese nation, small in size and with its economy still underdeveloped, was unable to confront the United States." Attributing successes since that time to the party's "revolutionary stand and correct, creative lines," as well as to the "sympathy, support, and aid from brothers and friends" and the "fighting spirit" of the Vietnamese, Thanh Son seemed to be directing a gratuitous slap at the policies of Moscow and Peking when he added:

If the world situation were not facing such complex changes as it is now, our success would certainly have been even greater.

Reaffirming Hanoi's determination to achieve its goals despite outside developments, Thanh Son added that the trend of the war is favorable and that: "Wherever Nixon goes--to the East or the West--and no matter what expedients and tricks he may resort to, he absolutely cannot reverse this trend of the war nor save the 'Vietnamization' strategy from complete defeat."

The "creativity and independence" of the Vietnamese party's line were also discussed in another article in TUYEN HUAN, authored by Hong Nam who, like Thanh Son, has published articles previously in both TUYEN HUAN and HOC TAP. Hong Nam also strongly reaffirmed Hanoi's commitment to the war, asserting that the national, democratic revolution and the unification of Vietnam require that "U.S. neocolonialism" be defeated. According to Hong Nam, "there is no other choice. This is not accidental but is a historical necessity." The article attributed differences among communists about policy toward the United States to their different

* A suggestion of these differences was contained in Pham Van Dong's 31 August 1965 national day speech when he addressed himself to "some people abroad" who feared that the Vietnam war might spread. Dong argued that this possibility would best be prevented through struggle and that any compromise with the United States would constitute "dangerous encouragement" to aggressive U.S. policies and spell greater dangers to peace and security. He also reassured "some people" who feared that a prolonged war would cause the Vietnamese heavy sacrifices and losses.

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interpretations of the strength of the United States, maintaining that "an inaccurate assessment of the U.S. imperialists has been a factor leading to different strategic stands in the struggle" against the United States. The Vietnamese party, according to Hong Nam, has arrived at "an accurate assessment" of U.S. strengths and weaknesses, thus demonstrating the party's "creative spirit and independent thinking" and allowing it to "determine the correct revolutionary lines, guidelines, and methods for defeating the U.S. imperialist aggressors." He went on, in discussion of different policies, to quote extensively from Le Duan. Among remarks by Le Duan he cited was a statement in his speech to the Vietnamese party Central Committee's 19th Plenum that

while applying Marxism-Leninism and Marxist military science and learning from the revolutionary experiences and revolutionary wars in our brotherly countries, we should be creative in implementing our lines, policies, aims, and methods, should think independently to discover revolutionary rules and war rules for our country and should not and cannot use certain formulas as unchangeable models and principles in conducting the revolution and war.*

* Le Duan's speech at the 19th Plenum, held sometime early in 1971, has been quoted in previous articles but never released in full.

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MIDDLE EAST

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ASSAILS ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON

A Soviet Government statement condemning the 16-17 September Israeli incursions into southern Lebanon, released promptly on the 17th, contained what seems the minimal response Moscow would feel itself constrained to make. The prime purpose seemed registered in a passage putting the USSR on record as "remaining on the side of the Arab peoples" at a time when Soviet policies in the Middle East have been under Arab attack. The statement's "strong" denunciation of the latest Israeli raids, and belatedly of the 8 September attacks on Lebanon and Syria as well, was in fact notably restrained and typically cautious on several counts:

- + Again insisting that there was no connection between the Israeli raids and the 5-6 September events at the Olympics in Munich, it followed past Soviet practice in ignoring the question of fedayeen activities in Lebanon. There was only one mention even of the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
- + It complained about alleged Western encouragement of Israel but referred only indirectly to the American veto in the Security Council debate on the 8 September Israeli raids. It nowhere mentioned the United States by name.
- + And while it routinely denounced Israel's "criminal actions" against the Arabs, it fell far short of the indictment of Israel in the last comparable Soviet Government statement, on 22 March 1968, which was also responsive to Israeli "provocations" against the Arabs. That statement had accused Israel of "following in the footsteps of the Hitlerite criminals."

The March 1968 government statement, issued the day after an Israeli strike at guerrilla centers in Jordan, had used that raid as a point of departure for a broadside against Israeli policy and behavior in general. Moscow's more normal practice has been to issue TASS statements on "military provocations" by Israel against its Arab neighbors, as well as on such incidents as the Israeli bombing of Abu Za'bal in Egypt in February 1970. The choice of the higher-level format of a government statement this time seems traceable to a defensive concern about appearances at a time of continuing worldwide outcry over the Munich events and resulting pressures for international action to combat terrorism.

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The higher-level format in a sense compensates for the relatively feeble content of the statement's reassertion of support for the Arabs, indictment of Israel, and treatment of the United States.

Moscow's sensitivity showed through clearly in a commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 19th, claiming that broad sections of Arab public opinion received the Soviet Government's statement with "deep satisfaction" as another "categorical proof" of the USSR's principled policy of combatting imperialist aggression. The commentary went on to berate unnamed "people in the Arab world" who at this very time "crudely deride" the Soviet Union, alleging that it is "not committed to any moral standards." The broadcast scornfully rejoined that there could be nothing more immoral than "standing among Arabs holding Soviet weapons" and at the same time criticizing the USSR; the weapons, it said, were "not Soviet charity," and it added that the Soviet people had worked with "complete self-denial" and "greatest sacrifices" to help the Arabs.

EVENTS IN MUNICH,
PALESTINIAN ROLE

Along the lines of recent Moscow comment, the government statement was at particular pains to disavow any connection between the "tragic incident" in Munich and the Israeli attacks and to dissociate the Arab states--specifically Syria and Lebanon--from "any responsibility for these events." The statement stopped short of any expression of disapproval of the terrorist actions in Munich. Cautious criticism, however, came from Podgorny in a 14 September speech at a dinner for the visiting Iraqi president: Rejecting any linkage between Munich and the Israeli attacks, he went on to declare that "naturally, we cannot look with favor on the actions of certain elements who harm the Palestinian movement."

At the same time, presumably with Moscow's Arab critics in mind, Podgorny assigned the Palestine resistance movement a "tangible role" in the general front of the Arab struggle against Israel and imperialism and pledged that the Soviet Union and other socialist states would remain "faithful friends" of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinians, in the struggle to liberate their territories and regain their "legitimate rights and national interests." PRAVDA had been criticized by Cairo's AKHBAR AL-YAWM on 9 September for declaring, in a 29 August article on the Palestinian resistance, that it was no longer acceptable to give the Palestinian movement a special mission in the Arab east. Chief editor al-Quddus added the charge that "a lot of things that are published imply nonsupport for fedayeen operations or for military operations which the

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Palestinian organizations, and consequently Arab organizations, might carry out." He further complained that the Soviet attitude toward fedayeen action was the same as its attitude toward the Arab states--one that "fixes the rate of armament at a level that does not permit a confrontation with Israel."

Echoing Podgorny, Moscow comment has combined careful expressions of disapproval of Munich-style terrorist operations with professions of support for a continuing Palestinian role in the Arab struggle. TASS commentator Kornilov maintained on the 19th that the Palestinian movement would continue to play an "essential role" in this struggle and that the Palestinians were fighting for a "just cause." Kornilov had declared in a commentary on the 15th that the world public "naturally cannot have a positive attitude to the actions to which some elements resort, actions that are to the detriment of the Palestinian movement."

The government statement did not make the charge, which has appeared in Soviet comment dealing with past Israeli raids on Lebanon, that Israel was seeking to disrupt Lebanese relations with the Palestinians. But IZVESTIYA on the 19th said that Tel Aviv was using the "massive bombings" in an effort to pit the Arab population against the Palestinians and eliminate their resistance movement. And PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov reported on the 20th that Arab League Secretary General Riyad had left Cairo for Beirut "in connection with press reports about friction" between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians. Glukhov, noting "alarming reports" in the Arab press that the next Israeli target would be Syria, said it was of paramount importance to coordinate all-Arab actions and "to prepare retaliatory measures" in case of an attack.

The government statement also failed to affirm that a Middle East solution should include recognition of the Palestinians' "legitimate rights"--or, as sometimes phrased, "national rights"--although this had been stressed repeatedly in Soviet comment on the 8 September attacks. The statement's only reference to Palestinians was in the charge that the Israeli Government bears "full responsibility" for "criminal actions" against the Arab countries and for the lives of peaceful residents of Lebanon, "including the Palestinian refugees."

U.S., UN ROLES U.S. support of Israel was treated carefully and by indirection in the statement: It merely said that the actions of the Israeli "expansionists" are encouraged by "certain circles in the West which are pursuing their own selfish aims." It further maintained that those who "openly or tacitly

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oppose, in the United Nations for instance," the adoption of resolute measures against the "Israeli aggressors" are assuming heavy responsibility to the Arab and other peoples. Routine comment has called the U.S. veto in the Security Council a "green light" to Israel for further "aggression" but has avoided inordinate emphasis on the American move.

While U.S. support for Israel continues to be decried in general terms and passing references to the U.S. veto have been frequent, only a handful of commentaries have dwelt on U.S. behavior in connection with the recent events. One of these, a foreign-language radio talk by Shakhov on the 16th, complained that after the Security Council vote the U.S. delegate "cynically declared" that Israel had the moral right to seek revenge on the Arabs after the Munich affair. Shakhov also charged the U.S. officials, proceeding from "various fleeting, transient factors"--implicit acknowledgment of the strained Soviet-Egyptian relations--believed that now was the time to pressure the Arab states into making serious concessions. Pointing to the U.S. veto, Radio Moscow told Arab listeners on the 13th that the hopes of "some political leaders in the Arab countries" to come to an understanding with the United States were a figment of the imagination. And a NOVOYE VREMENYA editorial reported by TASS on the 13th said the veto demonstrated the groundlessness of hopes that Washington was prepared to curb Israeli "expansionism."

Routinely accusing Israel of violating the UN Charter as well as decisions of the United Nations, the government statement typically avoided the question of possible sanctions against Israel. But the matter of sanctions, infrequently broached, was brought up in a Katin commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 17th which ticked off what it called Israeli violations of the charter and declared that there were possibilities for forcing Israel to adhere to international law and submit to the United Nations' will. The UN Charter "clearly stipulates the application of sanctions," Katin added, noting that a number of countries were calling more insistently for sanctions against Israel.

QUEST FOR PEACE Predictably refraining from any hint at possible Soviet action, the government statement merely asserted that "peaceloving countries and peoples" cannot "keep aloof" and should demand Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Its bland avowal that the USSR remains "on the side of" the Arabs contrasts with the March 1968 government statement's pledge that the USSR and other friends of the Arabs "will help the victims of aggression."

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The current statement said the Soviet Government believes there is "only one way" to peace in the Middle East--complete liberation of the occupied Arab lands and an opportunity for "all peoples" of the area to live in peace and security. Its concluding pledge that the USSR will continue to work toward ending Israel's "aggression" and establishing a fair and lasting peace was the closest it came to broaching the question of a political settlement. The government statement of March 1968 had specifically accused the Israelis of trying to thwart a political settlement and had repeatedly enjoined Israel to carry out its obligations under Security Council Resolution 242. The most recent Soviet Government statement on the Middle East, on 28 February 1971, placed heavy stress on a political settlement in anticipating a negative Israeli response to Dr. Jarring's initiative at that time to break the stalemate.

EAST EUROPEAN REACTION

"Categorical disapproval" of Israel's actions has been expressed by Romania, the only East European bloc country to maintain relations with Israel while concurrently seeking to develop friendship with the Arab states. An editorial note in the 19 September issue of the party daily SCINTEIA, reported by AGERPRES, said that "nothing, under no reason and in no form," could justify reprisals against a civilian population and the penetration of other states' territory by armed forces. Adding that no state can assume the right to violate the frontiers of another state, it advocated political negotiations as the only rational way to settle such problems as the Middle East conflict. Romanian media also reported on the 18th that Foreign Minister Manescu had summoned the Israeli ambassador and expressed his government's "concern" and "disapproval" of Israel's military actions against Lebanon.

Following Moscow's example, Bulgaria issued a government statement on the 18th condemning the Israeli actions and, like Moscow, rejecting Israeli attempts "to present these actions of theirs as 'retribution'" in connection with the "tragic incident" in Munich. GDR Premier Stoph, according to ADN on the 16th, promptly sent a telegram to his Lebanese counterpart "most strongly" protesting the Israeli attack and assuring Lebanon of sympathy and solidarity.

Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 16th, claiming that Israel seeks to block any effort toward a peaceful settlement under the pretext that the neighboring Arab states give refuge to Palestinians, asked rhetorically where the Palestinians should go. The paper dismissed the idea that extensive bombing of "Palestinian camps and Arab villages" in Syria and Lebanon had anything to do with any terrorism, asserting that the bombing itself represents "the worst kind of air terrorism."

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And Warsaw's ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI charged on the 19th that there would have been no tragedy in Munich "had it not been for the extremist policy of the Israeli aggressors." The violence and terror "employed on behalf of a state" and in the name of a right to retaliate through army power deserve condemnation, the paper concluded.

MOSCOW USES IRAQI PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO COUNTER ARAB CRITICS

Moscow has held up the 14-19 September visit of an Iraqi party-government delegation as an example of Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation, using it as an occasion to defend Soviet policies and motives in the Middle East in the face of Egyptian and other Arab criticism. The visit, the first to Moscow by President al-Bakr, marked the latest in a series of high-level talks this year initiated by the visit of Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn in February; Saddam Husayn's visit was followed by Kosygin's April visit to Iraq during which the Soviet-Iraqi friendship and cooperation treaty was signed.* While Moscow's reports on the al-Bakr visit uniformly referred to it simply as "official," the communique summed up the results of the "official friendly" visit, the label given to the Saddam Husayn and Kosygin visits. The talks, according to the communique, were held in an atmosphere of "friendliness, frankness, and understanding" in keeping with the spirit of the treaty.

DEFENSE OF
USSR POLICIES

Podgornyy set the tone of defensive justification of Soviet interests and policies in his 14 September speech at a banquet for al-Bakr, broadcast in full by Radio Moscow to Arab audiences. He denied allegations that the Soviet Union had "special interests" in the Middle East, and he again rejected the "slander" that the USSR benefited from prolongation of the no war, no peace situation in the area. Accusing imperialist, Zionist, and "Arab reactionary" circles of sowing doubts about the effectiveness of Soviet aid to the Arabs, he maintained that such machinations were designed to isolate the Arabs from their "natural allies," the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. "Our friends and others" know very well, Podgornyy asserted, that the Soviet Union, in cooperating with the Arab countries, has no "suspect aims"; as for its "special interests," these lie in rendering

* The Saddam Husayn and Kosygin visits are discussed, respectively, in the 24 February 1972 TRENDS, pages 34-37, and the 12 April 1972 TRENDS, pages 32-38.

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extensive support to the national liberation movement and helping the progressive regimes check "the intrigues of imperialism and Zionism."

Other Soviet comment has played the same themes, quoting President al-Bakr as saying that the current situation in the Middle East requires "more solidarity and cooperation" between Iraq and the USSR as well as between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union "at all levels and in all fields." And the Iraqi press has been cited as saying the visit would deal another blow to hostile forces bent on destroying Arab-Soviet friendship.

BILATERAL
RELATIONS

The wide range of subjects under discussion was indicated by the size and composition of the Iraqi delegation, which included the foreign, interior, health, and oil ministers, the chief of staff of the army,* officials of the irrigation ministry and the petroleum planning establishment, Revolution Command Council officials, the chief editor of ATH-THAWRAH, and the central bank's director of foreign exchange. While al-Bakr's entourage was billed as a "party and government" delegation, only al-Bakr himself was identified by his party title.

A short communique on Iraq Foreign Minister al-Baqi's Moscow talks in early June had noted agreement "on concrete talks to be held" by appropriate organizations of the two countries to conclude bilateral agreements on questions taken up in the June consultations. Although there were reports throughout the summer of Soviet-Iraqi talks at various levels on such matters as trade, communications, and oil, several questions apparently remained outstanding. The talks between the full delegations began in Moscow on the 14th and were continued at a "closed meeting" on the 15th between al-Bakr and the Soviet leaders. A second "enlarged meeting" was postponed, according to Baghdad accounts, so that four subcommittees could discuss "various aspects of cooperation." After the delegation's departure, Baghdad radio announced on the 19th that various members--representing oil, financial, and economic affairs--had stayed behind to "complete discussions on technical matters" agreed on during the visit.

* Defense Minister Shihab returned to Baghdad on 29 August after a 24-day visit to the USSR and a three-day trip to Czechoslovakia. He had paid month-long visits to the Soviet Union in September-October of 1970 and 1971 for a "rest."

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The communique registered both sides' satisfaction with the continued cooperation in developing Iraq's oil industry and "surmounting the difficulties" posed by "pressures of the international monopolist oil companies." They expressed readiness to pursue cooperation in economic, trade, and other fields and agreed on "tangible measures" to continually strengthen Iraq's "military ability and to raise the fighting standard of the armed forces." While no agreements were announced in the communique, TASS on the 19th reported the signing of a protocol on economic and technical cooperation whereby the Soviet Union would assist Iraq in "matters connected with construction and reconstruction of hydroengineering projects"; Baghdad radio additionally reported the signing of a "special document" on development of trade and economic relations.

Party relations, with which the sides also expressed satisfaction, got somewhat more attention than in the April communique on Kosygin's Baghdad visit. The communique recorded agreement to strengthen and expand these relations in a manner conducive to increased mutual understanding and to bolstering the struggle for peace and socialist progress and against "imperialism and Zionism." "Particular emphasis" was put on the "more extensive" development of CPSU-Iraqi Ba'th relations by Belyayev in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 17th. He called this "something new" in relations between the political organizations of Middle East countries and the CPSU; he also predicted that Moscow's reception of al-Bakr in his party capacity would promote further rapprochement between the CPSU and "progressive political parties and organizations" in the Arab countries.

The communique noted that al-Bakr, outlining Iraqi achievements, had acquainted the Soviet leaders with the "solidarity of all the national progressive forces" as well as with Baghdad's efforts to unify progressive Arab states. In turn, the Soviet side expressed satisfaction with steps taken toward settlement of the Kurdish question, not mentioned by al-Bakr, but was silent on the issue of solidarity of national forces. In his 14 September speech, Podgorny noted the "extreme importance" of steps "which have been taken" in Iraq to solve the Kurdish problem and unify all progressive patriotic forces "within the National Front." Moscow has been underlining the need to complete the organization of a national progressive front, as outlined in the draft Action Charter of last November, which would include the Ba'th, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK). According to Arab press reports, the USSR has tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the government and the Kurds. A DPK delegation had talks with CPSU representatives in Moscow in August, and a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 28 August noted that during that meeting the two sides pointed out the need to form such a national front.

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MIDEAST CONFLICT

In the communique, the two sides predictably noted the "serious threat to the Arab people's rights" and to peace flowing from Israeli "aggression" waged with continued U.S. "political, military, and financial support." Along the lines of Podgornyy's 14 September speech, the communique asserted the importance of bolstering the unity and solidarity of the Arab states, mobilizing Arab resources in the struggle against imperialism and "reaction," and strengthening cooperation with "the friendly countries and the socialist states." Podgornyy had urged the Arabs to consolidate their economic and "military" capabilities and strengthen their unity of action, relying on the wide support of the socialist countries.

As in the Soviet-Iraqi communiqes of last February and April, the two sides again declared that a just and firm peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the liberation of all occupied territories and without insuring the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people, and they again expressed support for the Palestinian people's struggle to restore these rights. They viewed the Palestinian resistance movement as an organic part of the Arab national liberation movement and pledged continued "material and moral support and political and moral backing for this movement."*

*A communique on the 17-27 July talks between a Palestine Liberation Organization delegation led by Yasir 'Arafat and representatives of the Soviet Committee of Afro-Asian Solidarity had said that the "Soviet people" would continue giving "assistance" to the Palestine resistance movement.

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DISARMAMENT

NEW SOVIET ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE AT 27TH UNGA SESSION

In an apparent preemptive effort to neutralize renewed Chinese attacks on Soviet arms control policy at the UN General Assembly session which opened on 19 September, Moscow has revived and refurbished two long-standing Soviet proposals in asking that the question of "non-use of force in international relations and banning for all time of the use of nuclear weapons" be placed on the agenda of the current session. The Soviets had been put on the defensive at last year's UNGA session by Chinese ridicule of their arms control policy as disarmament for others and arms expansion for themselves; the thrust of the Chinese critique last fall was that a nuclear power seriously interested in disarmament would pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Soviet proposal, in a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to UN Secretary General Waldheim first publicized by Moscow on 16 September, focuses attention on two arms control measures which have not been emphasized in formal Soviet proposals in recent years:

+ A ban on the use of nuclear weapons was first proposed by Moscow in the 1950's. Special emphasis was placed on a use ban by Soviet UN representatives in 1961, 1964, and 1967, and a draft convention was submitted to the UNGA in 1967. Although the ban proposal was given first priority in a list of urgent arms control measures outlined in a memorandum in connection with the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in July 1968, it was not among the partial disarmament measures specified in Brezhnev's exposition of the Soviet "peace program" at the 24th CPSU Congress in March 1971, and its prominence in Soviet comment declined as the series of recently negotiated partial measures took precedence.* The last publicized elite-level Soviet mention of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons was by Ambassador Roshchin at the Geneva disarmament talks in April of this year. The specification "for all time" is a new addition to past formulations of the ban proposal.

* Background on Soviet non-use proposals and a discussion of the July 1968 memorandum may be found in the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS of 28 September 1967, pages 2-3, and 5 July 1968, pages 4-5.

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+ A call for agreements incorporating pledges of non-use of force has characterized most Soviet statements in recent years on measures for strengthening international security. The Soviet and Polish bilateral treaties with the FRG signed in 1970 included non-use of force pledges. At the 24th Congress, Brezhnev commented that "the renunciation of the use of force and the threat of its use for solving vexing questions must become a law in international life" and proposed that countries sharing that view conclude agreements incorporating it on a bilateral and regional basis. The Prague Declaration on Europe signed by the Warsaw Pact countries in January 1972 called for agreements on the non-use of force on an all-European basis. At the Supreme Soviet session which ratified the USSR-FRG treaty in May, Podgornyy repeated that call and noted that such agreements "would open up extra opportunities for the drafting of specific measures on disarmament and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe." The new UN initiative represents a further expansion of the scope of the non-use of force proposal to a general "international" scale.

The resurrection of the proposal on banning the use of nuclear weapons and the broadening of the non-use of force concept seem contrived to wrest the initiative from the Chinese on disarmament at the current UNGA session. Peking's challenge to the Soviets had been enunciated at last fall's session in a speech by PRC representative Chiao Kuan-hua on 28 November:

If the Soviet Government truly has the desire for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the Soviet representative should come forward to this rostrum and solemnly declare that at no time and in no circumstances will the Soviet Union be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it will dismantle all nuclear bases and withdraw all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad.*

Just as the call for a use ban appears to be a Soviet alternative to the PRC's "no first use" proposal (the Chinese stipulation that participants in a disarmament conference of world leaders pledge first of all not to be the first to use nuclear weapons), so the new Soviet emphasis on non-use of force as an international concept appears directed in large part at the Chinese. PRC spokesmen have attempted, at last fall's UNGA session and elsewhere, to contrast the urgent need for limitations on the nuclear armaments of the two "superpowers" with the continuing need of other countries, especially China and the third world, for conventional armaments

* Soviet-PRC clashes on disarmament questions at last fall's UNGA session are discussed in the TRENDS of 17 November 1971, page 31,

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in order to defend themselves against the superpowers. Gromyko's letter is careful to emphasize conventional arms, in contrast with a de-emphasis on conventional arms limitation in lists of priority partial disarmament measures publicized by the Soviets in recent years. Noting that "by now the destructive force of even conventional means of warfare has grown so much that their wide use may lead to the annihilation of entire nations" and that their use in a local conflict "enhances the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear-missile war," he concluded that under a ban on the use of all kinds of weapons, "all the states of the world will find themselves in an equal position."

The Gromyko letter does not propose a draft convention incorporating these principles but suggests that "deliberations by the General Assembly on the Soviet-proposed question . . . as well as the adoption by the Assembly of an appropriate resolution will undoubtedly constitute a most important contribution to stronger international security and the prevention of the outbreak of armed conflicts."

MOSCOW DEVELOPS INDICTMENT OF PRC'S DISARMAMENT POSTURE

In preparation for a new round of disarmament debate at the UNGA session, Moscow has been subjecting Peking's position on arms control and disarmament to sharply polemical scrutiny. According to the case being developed in this Soviet comment, the Chinese have resorted to tactical maneuvers to disguise their intransigence while they continue to oppose all practical arms control measures as impediments to their own progress toward the status of a "first-class military power" and the leading international role which that would entail. The thrust of Moscow's approach seems directed at countering Peking's moves to attain such a role rather than at portraying a menacing growth of Chinese military might that would threaten Soviet security.

An article in the 1 September issue of NOVOYE VREMENYE (No. 36) by V. Gusachenko in effect applied I. Aleksandrov's 5 September analysis of the PRC's foreign policy in PRAVDA to the specific question of disarmament.* Noting that growing international isolation has forced "certain changes . . . in Peking's methods

* The Aleksandrov article is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 32-36.

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of pursuing its policy on disarmament questions" since mid-1970, Gusachenko charged that these have been only "tactical tricks" meant to disguise "incontrovertible evidence that the approach of the PRC's leaders to the disarmament problem has not undergone any changes."

Gusachenko and Nikolay Pukhovets, in a similar analysis broadcast by Moscow on 30 August, had cited as evidence Peking's belated official assessment of the SALT agreements as "the start of a new stage in the arms race" between the United States and the USSR.* They emphasized that in opposing SALT the Chinese leaders have joined "the military-industrial complex and the extreme rightwing circles of the imperialist countries." In effect, according to Mikhail Kotov, executive secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee, in an 11 September IZVESTIYA article, the PRC has "closed ranks with imperialist circles opposing detente and limitation of the arms race."

Moscow argues that the PRC's opposition to arms control measures stems from its aspirations to a leading role in international affairs. Gusachenko contended that the Chinese leaders believe "the primary means for achieving this goal . . . should be a powerful army equipped with nuclear weapons" and calculate that such a military buildup can be accomplished most effectively under conditions of international tension. That the PRC has in fact "recently sharply stepped up its nuclear missile preparations" was claimed by V. Rybakov in the 21 July issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN. Aleksandrov said in the 5 September article that one motive for recent Chinese overtures to the United States, Japan, and Western Europe was an intention to draw on those countries' scientific and technological know-how to aid in the buildup of the PRC's nuclear missile program as well as of its military potential in general.

* This assessment was made by Chou En-lai in a 17 July speech, discussed in the TRENDS of 19 July 1972, page 30. Pages 28-29 of the same issue discuss another I. Aleksandrov article, on 16 July, that had taken issue with views on disarmament ascribed to Chou by Congressmen Boggs and Ford after their talks with the Chinese.

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Like the new UN initiative on non-use of force, the Gusachenko and Rybakov analyses reflected Soviet sensitivity to Chinese attempts at last fall's UNGA session to emphasize the urgency of disarmament by the nuclear "superpowers" and play down the importance of controls on the conventional armaments of the rest of the world. They both condemned the Chinese for attempting, in Gusachenko's words, "to artificially divorce the solution of problems concerning nuclear disarmament from the problems of conventional armament."

Conceding that the PRC has taken certain initiatives on disarmament, Soviet commentators argue that they were motivated by tactical considerations. Discussing the reactivation of the long-standing Chinese proposal for a disarmament summit conference of world leaders, Gusachenko and Rybakov contended that the Chinese leaders believe the preconditions and "ultimatums" attached to their summit proposal--primarily a prior pledge of "no first use" of nuclear weapons by the summit conference participants--will insure its rejection by the "imperialist" nations and thus absolve the PRC of responsibility for the failure of an initiative it did not want to succeed in the first place. The commentaries also claimed that the Chinese, despite a shift in tactics on disarmament matters, had failed to support a single resolution on disarmament of the more than 10 that were submitted to the UNGA during its first session after the PRC was seated in that body last fall--thus ignoring the PRC vote in favor of the 16 December 1971 resolution on a world disarmament conference (WDC). Gusachenko observed that "in the entire history of the PRC, Chinese representatives have not once participated in any talks or conference on this subject."

Recently stepped-up comment on the PRC's behavior in the United Nations anticipating the opening of the current UNGA session has particularly emphasized the PRC's negative attitude toward participation in the work of the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and Peking's rejection of Moscow's proposals for a conference of the five nuclear powers and a world disarmament conference. That Moscow hopes to focus the UNGA disarmament debate on their WDC proposal as well as on the new initiative on non-use of force and banning the use of nuclear weapons is indicated by V. Viktorov's observation--in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No. 9, signed to press on 22 August--that "it is easy to foresee that the question of a world disarmament conference will occupy one of the central places in the work of the upcoming 27th UNGA session."

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Viktorov said the Soviet Government considered it essential for the Assembly to proceed "to the examination of practical measures to prepare for it." An article by M. Sturua in the 9 September IZVESTIYA suggests that Moscow will attempt to exploit the similarity in the positions of the PRC and the United States on the world conference proposal:

It is by no means an accident that the United States came out along with the PRC against the convening of a world disarmament conference. On this question, having observed the activity of the United Nations, one cannot fail to draw the conclusion that a unique united front of Maoism and imperialism has been formed on the East River.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

KISSINGER'S MOSCOW VISIT HAILED AS CONTRIBUTION TO DETENTE

Limited Soviet comment on Presidential adviser Kissinger's 10-14 September visit to Moscow has hewed closely to the joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the outcome of the talks, emphasizing the progress made on European security and bilateral relations. The visit has been portrayed as an exercise in coexistence and in effect as another dividend for Brezhnev's detente policy and personal diplomacy. Thus PRAVDA on the 15th prominently featured the joint statement on the talks under the frontpage headline "On Brezhnev's Talks With H. Kissinger." PRAVDA's only comment on the visit came in an international review by Yermakov on the 17th, which hailed the talks as 'contribution to "the consolidation of peace." Almost the entire world press, Yermakov approvingly noted, has welcomed the talks as another step on the path to international detente.

A Radio Moscow broadcast in English to North America on the 16th carried a commentary by Berezhkov, editor-in-chief of the Moscow journal USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, noting that the principle of peaceful coexistence in Soviet-U.S. relations had first been affirmed at the Moscow summit in May in the document "Basic Principles in Relations Between the USSR and the United States." He declared that strict observance of these principles would open up "vast prospects for developing relations" and observed that "much progress has been made." Noting that the gap between the two countries on a number of matters has "definitely grown smaller of late," he said "this indicates that the United States has adopted a more realistic approach to them." In this context, Berezhkov cited the expressed U.S. support for continuation of the disarmament negotiations as well as a statement by a State Department spokesman on U.S. readiness to participate in the preliminary consultations in Helsinki on a European security conference.

SENATE APPROVAL OF
SALT INTERIM ACCORD

While generally playing down Senate approval of the Jackson amendment, Soviet media promptly reported the

"overwhelming" endorsement of the Interim Agreement on limiting offensive weapons. Quoting praise for the agreement by Senator Cranston and criticism of the Jackson amendment by Senator Fulbright, a 15 September TASS report noted that "a group of

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"rightwing senators" led by Jackson had "managed, with the use of different maneuvers, to drag through an amendment in which the attempt is made to undermine these two agreements based on the principle of equal security." TASS went on to stress that the Senate's approval was by an "overwhelming majority" of 88 to 2 and must now go to a joint House-Senate committee for final approval. The report concluded by citing Press Secretary Ziegler to the effect that the President was "greatly pleased" with the Senate's approval of the agreement.

PRAVDA's version of this TASS report the following the day omitted the reference to Ziegler on the President's reaction, where IZVESTIYA's version retained it. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the 16th carried another TASS report of 15 September which merely said that the Senate approved the agreement and that the House had endorsed it earlier. Notably, the military paper on the 17th published a commentary on the Pentagon's "record budget" which concluded: "It is clear, of course, that the inflation of the Pentagon's budget to record heights contradicts the principle of equal security of the sides, which is the basis for the Soviet-American agreements."

SILENCE ON
U.S. CRITICISM

Soviet media have ignored statements by members of Congress opposing economic concessions to the Soviet Union as long as Moscow continues to impose exit fees on would-be Jewish emigrants. Recent Soviet comment seeking to justify the 3 August law on the exit fees has conspicuously avoided any mention of the Congressional efforts to link this issue with the Soviet-U.S. trade discussions.

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WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS

PUBLICITY FOR "SHIELD 72" SHOWS RESTRAINT TOWARD WEST

Soviet and East European coverage of the 12-16 September Warsaw Pact "Shield 72" maneuvers in Czechoslovakia has been marked by noticeable restraint toward the West in comparison with the treatment of the "Brotherhood-in-Arms" exercises in East Germany in October 1970, the last major maneuvers of the combined forces. The current comment, unlike that of 1970, has for the most part avoided naming NATO and the FRG as the intended adversaries. Rather, it has taken the tack of acknowledging the recent progress toward East-West detente, warning at the same time against unspecified "militarist" threats to the improved climate in Europe. Moscow's comment on the concurrent NATO "Strong Express" maneuvers has avoided juxtaposing those exercises with the Warsaw Pact games, charging instead that the impetus for the NATO exercises was provided by "myths about a 'menace from the East.'"

Where the 1970 Warsaw Pact exercises had brought together for the first time troops of all the member states, including a token division staff from Romania, the recent maneuvers reverted to the regional tradition with the active participation of only Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, GDR, and Hungarian troops and the attendance of the Bulgarian and Romanian defense ministers as "observers." Bucharest media carried characteristically brief reports on Romanian Defense Minister Ionita's participation in the exercises.

CZECHOSLOVAK ROLE

In addition to the restraint regarding the putative Western adversaries, there was an obvious effort to avoid any affront to the sensibilities of Czechoslovakia, the country hosting the "Shield 72" exercises. In line with the usual practice of entrusting the command of Pact exercises to the defense minister of the host country, the latest games were commanded by CSSR Defense Minister Dzur, the only major federal minister held over from the Dubcek era. Marshal Grechko, in his Prague speech at the conclusion of the exercises, took pains to praise the Czechoslovak military and political leaders for their role in the exercises.

At the main public function of the maneuvers, a parade of the participating troops in Prague on the 17th, Yakubovskiy and CPCZ General Secretary Husak notably avoided any direct

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reference to the 1968 events in their speeches. Confining himself to a broad tribute to the progress of Czechoslovak "consolidation" since 1968, Yakubovskiy noted that "all of us rejoice to see that the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia under CPCZ leadership are successfully implementing the plans of socialist building and making a worthy contribution to consolidation of our socialist community." In his formal welcome to the visiting delegations, on the same platform, Husak paid tribute "above all" to the delegation from the Soviet army, "our liberator." Implicitly underscoring the absence of any manifestations of popular resentment in Czechoslovakia toward the foreign Warsaw Pact troops, Husak noted "the fraternal and internationalist attitude of our citizens toward members of the allied armed forces on our territory." He added that the meetings between the foreign troops and Czechoslovak citizens as well as the maneuvers themselves exemplified "patriotism and internationalism." Both speakers juxtaposed acknowledgments of the progress of detente in Europe with stress on the preparedness of the Warsaw Pact forces, and both added a swipe at the "dirty" war waged by "American imperialism" in Vietnam.

In contrast to the reticence of Yakubovskiy and Husak regarding the 1968 events, an editorial in the Prague party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 16th bluntly observed:

Our people are well aware of the role of the Warsaw Treaty as a shield of the socialist development of our homeland in safeguarding our national and state security. Our people come to understand better and better the internationalist mission of the allied armies in the crucial moments when . . . rising counterrevolutionary forces risked mass bloodshed which was prevented in time by the allies, following the request of the socialist forces of our country.

PEKING REPORT The concurrence of the NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises may explain why Peking issued its first report on a Warsaw Pact exercise--a fairly lengthy 17 September NCNA account of the two blocs' maneuvers which was free of original comment but drew on the London TIMES and Belgrade's KOMUNIST to convey a disapproving portrayal of the military blocs as instruments of big-power pressure and hegemony. It quoted the TIMES to the effect that the NATO games "reflect military concern over the expansion of Soviet forces in the North" and KOMUNIST as saying that joint military exercises "assume ever more frequently the character of the

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demonstration of military power, political blackmail, and psychological pressure." NCNA also repeated KOMUNIST's observation that there have been 23 Warsaw Pact and more than 35 NATO joint maneuvers since 1960. The report was disseminated in Peking's foreign and domestic services.

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CHINA

PEKING USES PING-PONG DIPLOMACY TO EXPAND INTERNATIONAL TIES

With the rapid evolution in PRC-Japanese relations eroding one of the Chiang Kai-shek regime's most important assets by undercutting the political significance of Japanese ties with Taiwan, Peking has moved adroitly across a broad front to enhance its international standing at the expense of Taipei's, including a gesture to Taiwan that may signal a new effort toward resolving the two-Chinas question. Again making use of "ping-pong diplomacy" to promote new openings and to reduce old hostilities, Peking has been probing opportunities for improving relations with a range of Asian countries while laying the groundwork for further efforts aimed at the entire third world. Having heralded the recent Asian table tennis championships as taking place in "a new situation in which the people of Asia are advancing in unity," Peking has announced that it will also host a table tennis tournament next year to promote friendship and unity among the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In another area of sports diplomacy in which the Taiwan question figured, the PRC on 22 August politely but firmly rejected an invitation to send an observer delegation to the Munich Olympic games on the grounds that the inclusion of "the Chiang Kai-shek clique" promotes a two-Chinas or one China, one Taiwan situation. A message from the PRC sports federation expressed confidence that this "absurd situation" will eventually be rectified.

Though the Taiwan question was not mentioned, Peking's drive to broaden its international standing was reflected in Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's statement, in a speech on 20 August welcoming his Tanzanian counterpart, that the PRC wishes to establish friendly relations with "all the independent African countries"--an offer that relaxes past demands imposed by Peking for developing relations. Acting along this line, Chou En-lai on 5 September sent national day greetings for the first time to Swaziland, long one of the ROC's firmest supporters. The PRC also sent a national day message on 1 September to Libya, which has expressed an interest in relations with the PRC but has continued its ties with the ROC. Chou reiterated Peking's determination to seek relations with all independent African countries in a speech on 17 September welcoming the Zambian vice president.

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PING-PONG DIPLOMACY Extensive publicity for the 2-13 September Asian table tennis championships held in Peking under the auspices of the new Asian Table Tennis Union included two PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials hailing the success of "this new-type international sport organization of wide representation." In fact, virtually every Asian country was represented except Indonesia, Mongolia, Australia, and New Zealand. Underscoring the political significance Peking attached to the occasion, all of the active Politburo members in the capital except Mao and his wife attended a reception on 14 September for the visiting table tennis players and officials.

In the most notable development connected with these games, a Thai team arrived in Peking accompanied by an important government official, Prasit Kanchanawat, who was honored by separate meetings with Chou, Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung, and Vice Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang. Peking signaled the political implications of the Thai team's visit by identifying Prasit by his official government title in reporting these meetings with Chinese leaders. Peking did not otherwise characterize these meetings, but NCNA reported that Prasit had "a friendly conversation" on 1 September with Liao Cheng-chih, who was not identified by title in the dispatch but who in the past was prominent in Overseas Chinese affairs, an important dimension in Sino-Thai relations. Prasit was quoted by the Bangkok radio on 14 September as saying that he had discussed Overseas Chinese affairs with Han, who voiced Peking's line that Overseas Chinese should behave as good citizens and obey the laws of their resident countries. Reports on the Thai team's visit and Prasit's activities were broadcast to Thailand by Radio Peking.

Other Southeast Asian countries represented were Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, who were already out ahead of Thailand in improving relations with Peking. A day before the opening of the championships in Peking, NCNA carried a feature on the July visit of a PRC table tennis team to Singapore, repeating the 15 July NCNA reference to Lee Kuan Yew as the prime minister of the "Republic of Singapore"--the first such acknowledgment of Lee and Singapore by their official titles. Subsequently, an NCNA dispatch on 17 September reported the installation the previous day of a new Singapore cabinet with Lee as prime minister, further signaling Peking's interest in normalizing relations with the island republic.

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The Indonesians were absent from the broadly represented Peking games, but Foreign Minister Malik stated on 2 September that they had received an invitation. He added that the PRC is showing more interest in improving Sino-Indonesian relations, citing the attendance of PRC officials at the Indonesian national day celebrations held at the UN mission on 17 August.

Peking's ecumenical use of ping-pong was further evidenced in the 11 September announcement that a preparatory committee for an Asian-African-Latin American table tennis tournament had entrusted the Chinese with organizing such a tournament to be held in Peking next year. Pointing up the political significance of this move, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 14 September observed that the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America had "the common experiences of suffering from aggression and oppression by imperialism and colonialism," and that today they are faced with "the common fighting tasks of opposing aggression and interference, defending national independence and territorial integrity, and developing the national economy and culture." Similarly, a Chinese official remarked at a reception on the same day that "the peoples of the third world are closely linked by their common experience in the past and their common fighting tasks at present."

INVITATION TO TAIWAN

In a notable expression of this ecumenical spirit, Peking reported on 27 August that the Asian Table Tennis Union's executive committee, hoping to unite the people of Asia on the "broadest possible scale," expressed readiness to welcome a Taiwan team if it participated in the name of "the Taiwan provincial team" of the PRC. While such an invitation evoked a predictably angry rejection by the ROC, it represented a new gesture on Peking's part that could signal a new effort to prepare the groundwork for an eventual accommodation on the Taiwan question. Peking's strong endorsement of recent initiatives aimed at an accommodation between the two Koreas has had significant implications for the Taiwan question, which Peking evidently hopes will become more tractable as trends toward detente in Asia introduce new movement in relations that have long been frozen.

Not exactly analogous to the Taiwan situation but suggestive of the type of accommodation Peking may envisage for that question, Hong Kong and Macao were represented at the Asian games by "regional" (ti chu) table tennis delegations. As in the case of Taiwan, Peking has been concerned to avoid acknowledging that Hong Kong and Macao have been juridically alienated from the PRC or that their legal status is indeterminate, but Peking has not indicated an intent to challenge existing administrative and economic arrangements.

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AFRICA

MOSCOW DEPLORES, PEKING IGNORES FIGHTING IN SOUTHERN UGANDA

Moscow's initial reports and comment on the fighting that broke out on the Ugandan-Tanzanian border on the 17th, while favoring the Ugandan version of the events, have sought to project a semblance of neutrality by publicizing Tanzanian denials of the Ugandan charges and deplored the hostilities as helpful only to the enemies of the emerging African states. Moscow had hosted a Ugandan military delegation headed by the acting commander of the Ugandan army, Colonel Ngangweso, from 30 July to 10 August. While publicizing the denials from Dar es Salaam of Ugandan President Amin's charges that Tanzanian troops are involved, Soviet media have not mentioned the Tanzanian characterization of the insurgents as the "Ugandan People's Army." The fighting has yet to be reported by Peking, Tanzania's close ally.

The closest Moscow has come so far to publicizing the Tanzanian view of the affair is a remark in a brief Moscow domestic service commentary on the 19th to the effect that "Tanzanian informed circles are voicing the supposition" that the clashes occurred between Amin's troops and "the opponents of the present government." The commentary concluded with a neutral observation to the effect that "reports on the aggravation of the situation on the Ugandan-Tanzanian border cannot fail to cause concern among the peaceloving public, since complications of this sort play into the hands of the enemies of the young African states." A Moscow broadcast in English to Africa the same day reported a comment in the same vein in the 19 September PRAVDA.

The initial outbreak of hostilities was reported in a Moscow broadcast in English to Africa on the 17th which cited a Ugandan military spokesman in Kampala as announcing that Tanzanian troops that morning had crossed the border with Uganda and were advancing toward the town of Masaka. The broadcast added that the commander in chief of the Tanzanian armed forces had "denied the report that his country's troops had invaded Ugandan territory." On the 19th, a Moscow international service newscast said President Amin had told representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that "Tanzanian troops and emigres, supporters of former President Dr. Milton Obote"--

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deposed by President Amin last year and now residing in Tanzania--"were taking part in the attack and they are supported by British and Israeli mercenaries." Later the same day TASS reported that in connection with "the deterioration of the situation in East Africa," OAU Secretary General Nzo Ekangaki had left Addis Ababa for Kenya and Uganda to study the situation "and take measures to settle the crisis."

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CZECHOSLOVAK TRIALS

MOSCOW TRIES TO PORTRAY WESTERN COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR TRIALS

Displaying continued sensitivity to sustained criticism of the recent Czechoslovak trials in the press of a number of West European communist parties, Moscow has attempted in two PRAVDA articles to demonstrate general support among Western CP's for the trials of "individuals who violated the laws" of the CSSR. PRAVDA on 9 and 13 September cited statements by the press or the leadership of five pro-Soviet communist parties--of Canada, the United States, Luxembourg, Austria, and Greece--and the hardline faction of the Finnish CP expressing support for the Czechoslovak party's stand on the issue. Moscow had previously publicized statements of support for the Czechoslovak leadership by Soviet bloc parties and Cuba.

Moscow has largely refrained from direct rejoinders to the continuing criticism of the trials in the press of the influential Italian and French communist parties as well as of the British, Spanish, Belgian, Swedish, Swiss, Norwegian, and Dutch CP's. Radio Moscow did summarize for foreign audiences the open letter from Soviet Ambassador to France Abrasimov to French Socialist leader Mitterand replying to the latter's criticism of the Czechoslovak trials and the new Soviet exit fees for emigrants. But the letter--published in the French CP organ L'HUMANITE on 4 September along with a restatement of the French party's critical view of the Czechoslovak situation--was not reported in the Soviet central press.

By contrast, Czechoslovak leader Husak addressed himself directly to the Western communist parties' criticisms of the trials in a speech on 26 August rebuking "certain representatives of the progressive forces in the West" for "showing themselves to be astonishingly indifferent to objective information" about the trials.*

* See the TRENDS of 30 August 1972, pages 38-40, for a discussion of Husak's speech.

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